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Cases of Note — Trade Secrets – Nondisclosure
Agreements – Non-compete Clauses
by Bruce Strauch (The Citadel) <strauchb@citadel.edu>
Decision Insights, Inc. v. Sentia Group,
Inc., United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 2654.
Decision Insights, Inc. (DII) developed
software called a “Dynamic Expected Utility Model” (“EU Model”) which became the
primary asset of the company. EU Model is
an analytical tool used in preparing negotiating
strategies. It assesses risk, compares different
operating positions and trade-offs among the
alternatives. Since 1989, DII has used the EU
Model and owns the assets, copyright, and all
proprietary rights.
Gary Slack and Dr.
Bruce Mesquita developed the EU Model
from scratch. Slack is
on DII’s board; Mesquita is no longer with
the company.
In 1998, Carol Alsharabati was hired to make
modifications to the EU
Model. She signed a confidentiality agreement. Curiously, she had absolutely
no computer training, but admits gaining valuable experience while with the company.
Is it that easy? So why are we not software
magnates?
Around 2001, Mark Abdollahian and three
others — Kugler, Efird and Scott — who had
worked with Alsharabati — left DII to form
Sentia Group. All but Kugler had signed
Trade Secret Nondisclosure Agreements
(“Agreements”) and Efird’s had a non-compete clause.
Are you following all these players? It’s
only semi-important in the case. Although the
dynamics of folks jumping ship and going into
competition holds its business interest.
The original plan was to obtain a software
license from DII and operate in a separate
territory. After all, one of them had signed a
non-compete agreement. But Sentia could not
reach agreement with DII.
Deciding to develop their own version of
the software, Sentia sought legal counsel and
were advised that no one who had had access
to the DII code be involved in the task. If this
was not possible, the new code should bear
no resemblance whatsoever to the EU Model.
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And they had better document every step in the
development process.
As so many clients do, Sentia ignored
counsel’s advice and hired Alsharabati to do
the work. And she did so in the record time
of six weeks.
DII claimed the software is identical to the
EU Model and sued for breach of contract,
misappropriation of trade secrets and other
theories not of interest to us here.

Litigation
So far so good. But then DII got sloppy in
the discovery process and failed to identify its
trade secrets with specificity or differentiate
them from what is public knowledge. Sentia asked for sanctions, so DII scrambled
about and identified its entire source
code (i.e., mathematical equations) as a
total compilation that was the big trade
secret and twelve major components
that were each secrets as well.
Sentia huffed and puffed about that, and
DII was ordered to produce “all algorithms,
block flow diagrams, narratives” associated
with the development of EU Model. And Sentia was awarded attorney’s fees for its efforts
in acquiring this information.
DII said the software was over fifteen
years old and they didn’t have the algorithms.
Reverse engineering would cost in the range
of $100,000. The magistrate judge brought
them all in again and said if the stuff didn’t
exist, then it didn’t. And imposed sanctions
of $13,256.25.
Ouch.
Sentia moved for summary judgment based
on the failure of DII to meet the burden of
establishing trade secrets. Sentia won this,
and DII appealed.

The Appeal – Trade Secrets
The state of Virginia defines a “trade secret”
as “information including but not limited to a
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique or process, that:
1. Derives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and

2. Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.” Va. Code. § 59.1-336.
The key is secrecy rather than novelty.
Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting &
Packaging, Inc., 240 Va. 297, 397 S.E.2d
110,113 (Va. 1990). “Novelty in the patent
law sense, is not required for a trade secret.”
Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996
F.2d 655, 664 (4th Cir. 1993).
Thus the whole secrecy issue is fact-intensive and very much a jury question. Hoechst
Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d
411, 419 (4th Cir. 1999). DII said its software is a compilation within which there are
twelve specific functions, any or all of which
are protected trade secrets. Which — see the
requirements above — is a complex question of
fact. The Fourth Circuit agreed and remanded
to the district court.

Trade Secret Nondisclosure
Abdollahian and others signed agreements
not to disclose DII’s proprietary information.
They assigned work product to DII and agreed
to return all confidential stuff when they left.
The district court basically ignored this saying
there was no evidence of breach because there
was no evidence of any trade secrets.
Since the Fourth Circuit had sent the trade
secret issue back for a jury trial, then this was
reversed as well.
Kugler had never executed his nondisclosure agreement but a letter from him to DII
stated he would never make improper use of
confidential information. DII said they would
never have shared anything with him without
such an understanding.
The absence of a writing does not mean
there was no binding agreement. It is a question of intent. If the parties have a meeting
of the minds — and part of the understanding
was that a written contract would be executed
— then “…there results an obligatory contract
which neither party is at liberty to repudiate.”
Manss-Owens Co. v. H.S. Owens Son, 129
Va. 183, 105 S.E. 543, 547 (Va. 1921) (quoting Boisseau v. Fuller, 96 Va. 45, 30 E.E. 457
(Va. 1898).
Well, those dates seem to make that established law. But the cases do distinguish this from
continued on page 64
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Questions & Answers — Copyright Column
Column Editor: Laura N. Gasaway (Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Univ. of North Carolina-Chapel Hill School of Law,
Chapel Hill, NC 27599; Phone: 919-962-2295; Fax: 919-962-1193) <laura_gasaway@unc.edu> www.unc.edu/~unclng/gasaway.htm
QUESTION:  A court library has recently
had discussions with an attorney about the
copyright status of state court briefs.  The attorney believes that briefs are copyrightable and
that Lexis, Westlaw infringe when they include
briefs in their databases without permission.
The library maintains that state court briefs are
public information and not subject to copyright.
Is there a difference in U.S. government works
and state government documents?
ANSWER: Section 105 of the Copyright
Act says that works produced by the federal
government are not copyrightable. Because
the Act is a federal statute, it is silent as to the
status of state documents. Many states claim
copyright in their documents or at least in some
of them. The Copyright Office Compendium
says that state statutes and court reports are
not copyrightable. The question, of course, is
whether briefs filed in a state court are government documents.
If the brief is for the state as a party to the
litigation, and the brief is prepared by attorneys
who are state employees, the brief is likely to
be a government document, so the answer as
to whether it is copyrighted or not will depend
on whether the state claims copyright in its
documents. If, however, the brief is one written by a private attorney for a private party
to the litigation, then the brief may well be
copyrighted. Some attorneys and law firms do
claim copyright in their briefs and are particularly unhappy with services such as Lexis and
Westlaw which sell copies of their briefs.
To my knowledge, there are no
cases on this issue, and the legal
authorities seem to say only that
there may be copyright in briefs.
Another possibility, of course, is
that in filing the brief with a court,
that brief becomes public domain
as a part of the court record, but

Cases of Note
from page 62
a situation where no one intended to be bound
until a formal execution of a written contract.
At any rate, we certainly have a nice question of
fact as to what their minds met upon.

Non-competition Clause
Efird entered into an agreement to not
compete with DII’s “precise” business for a
period of two years. Virginia law examines
these contracts on a basis of (1) limiting the
scope to what is reasonably necessary to protect
legitimate business interests of the employer,
and (2) not unduly oppressing the employee in
his efforts to earn a living. Blue Ridge Anesthesia & Critical Care, Inc. v. Gidick, 239 Va.
369; 389 S.E.2d 467, 470 (Va. 1990).

64

Against the Grain / November 2009

this does not appear to be a very strong argument. Public domain is certainly the best argument from an open government type argument,
however. But consider the following. A song
writer has not published a particular song, but it
is introduced into evidence in a court in a case
concerning the ownership of the copyright.
Clearly, introduction of the song into evidence
in court does not make that song public domain.
Analogizing to briefs would mean that they do
not become public domain just because they are
filed in court. Unfortunately, this is one area
where there is no clear answer.
QUESTION:  A teacher in a nonprofit educational institution music therapy program is
interested in the use of sheet music and printed scores in that program and asks whether
fair use, the Teach Act or other statutes and
regulations apply. What are the guidelines
for students who routinely download sheet
music to learn and bring into lessons and
music therapy clinical sessions?
ANSWER: If these music therapy sessions
are for teaching students to be music therapists,
then the Guidelines on the Educational Use of
Music apply. They are available at: http://
www.unc.edu/~unclng/music-guidelines.htm.
The guidelines cover both the reproduction
of music recordings as well as sheet music
for educational purposes but for study not for
performance. General fair use also applies. For
performance and display of nondramatic music
in a face-to-face classroom, the section 110(1)
exception applies and permits the performance
if the purpose is for instruction
and the other conditions are met.
If the class is a transmitted or
online class, then the TEACH
Act permits the performance.
Neither of these sections apply to
reproducing sheet music though.
If the music is to be performed,

These covenants are not favored as they are
restraints on trade and are strictly construed
against the employer including putting the
burden of proof of reasonableness on him.
See Grant v. Carotek, 737 F.2d 410, 411-412
(4th Cir. 1984).
The district court found the agreement was
“broader than necessary” to protect DII’s legitimate interests. But this was premised upon
the belief that DII had no trade secrets. “The
possession of trade secrets and confidential
information is an important consideration in
testing the reasonableness of a restriction on
competition.” Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577,
95 W.E.2d 186, 191 (Va. Ct. App. 1956).
And the sanctions got vacated as the parties had a genuine dispute as to how to identify trade secrets, and the district court was
muddled on the issue.

it is a good idea to ask students to make sure
that they examine the copyright notice on the
sheet music on the Web and make sure that
there is no restriction on downloading for
performance.
QUESTION:  Many libraries are lending
eBooks on a Kindle. Is this infringement to
lend a Kindle loaded with copyrighted books
acquired from Amazon?
ANSWER: The Amazon license agreement was last updated in February 2009, see
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=200144530, and is silent
about lending Kindles loaded with purchased
eBooks. One part of the license states: “Upon
your payment of the applicable fees set by
Amazon, Amazon grants you the non-exclusive right to keep a permanent copy of the
applicable Digital Content and to view, use,
and display such Digital Content an unlimited
number of times, solely on the Device or as
authorized by Amazon as part of the Service
and solely for your personal, non-commercial
use. Digital Content will be deemed licensed
to you by Amazon under this Agreement unless
otherwise expressly provided by Amazon.”
Library lending is for personal, non-commercial use.
When librarians have contacted Amazon to
request clarification, the answers received are
not clear. As the library lending of Kindles
becomes more prevalent, it is likely that the
license agreement will be redrafted to deal with
this type of use. Online license agreements
that are clearly written and easily located on a
Website tend to be upheld by courts. Further,
a library would be considered to have more
knowledge than an individual user might, so the
license agreement is more likely to be upheld.
A recent Library Journal (http://www.
libraryjournal.com/article/CA6649814.html)
article pointed out the mixed messages that
Amazon has provided on this matter. At this
point, however, with the online license not
mentioning lending of the devices, there appears to be no reason that a library could not
lend Kindles to users.
QUESTION:  Can a touchscreen smartboard be used for story time in a public
library?
ANSWER: As phrased, this is a technology question and not a copyright one. Use of the
technology itself presents no problems on the
copyright front. However, if one reproduces
works to be displayed on the smartboard, then
the same issues are present as with photocopying or with displaying images. If the question
contemplates displaying all of the words of the
story on the screen to help with reading and/or
including the illustrations, this is reproducing
an entire work and probably is infringement.
If permission is sought from the publisher, it is
likely that permission would be granted.
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